By Collins Chong Yew Keat

KUALA LUMPUR, US: This year is not a year in which U.S. President Donald Trump is being judged by the world; it is the year in which the world is forced to adjust to him. After years of strategic drift, performative and selective multilateralism, and unchecked revisionism by adversaries who mistook restraint for weakness, the return of Trump has reintroduced a hard truth and reality check into global politics: power still matters, credibility must be enforced, and American leadership is not optional to global stability.

What is unfolding is not a moral reckoning with Trump, but a strategic reckoning by allies, competitors, and institutions alike – one compelled by the reassertion of U.S. leverage, clarity, and resolve.

Against the backdrop of intensified rivalry and a widening gap between aspirational multipolar rhetoric and the material realities of power, alternative blocs and hedging strategies have proliferated. Yet the structure of the international system continues to rest on American military, economic, and technological primacy.

International Law Without Enforcement Power

International law remains a fundamental pillar of global order, but its enforcement is increasingly inconsistent. States invoke legal principles when aligned with national interests and disregard them when they are not. Persistent tensions from the South China Sea to Ukraine continue to illustrate this pattern. Legal norms hoped to deter violations and aggression have been hampered in full efficacy. They do not constrain revisionist behaviour without credible enforcement mechanisms, resulting in a realist structure where all powers act to defend their own interests.

This exposes a central reality of international politics: law is effective only when backed by credible power and the ability to enforce consequences with sufficient deterrence. In the contemporary system, only the United States retains the full spectrum of this deterrence – global reach, military capability, and economic leverage required to impose costs across regions. The persistence of the existing order, however imperfect, therefore remains inseparable from continued U.S. dominance.

Hedging Strategies and the Limits of Strategic Ambiguity

Many middle and smaller powers continue to pursue hedging strategies and fallback options, balancing economic engagement with China while maintaining security ties with the United States. This approach is becoming increasingly untenable.

Rising economic coercion, grey-zone maritime tactics, cyber pressure, and regulatory retaliation by U.S. adversaries have raised the cost of ambiguity. In 2026, alignment is no longer a binary choice, but neither is it cost-free. States are increasingly compelled to prioritise resilience over opportunism, as ambiguity itself becomes a liability.

The Structural Weakness of Alternative Orders

The growing discourse around BRICS expansion, Global South solidarity, and a China-led order reflects dissatisfaction with Western dominance and attempts to rewrite the international system. Yet these alternatives have shown limited efficacy. BRICS remains internally fragmented, lacking institutional cohesion, collective security mechanisms, and a trusted financial alternative to the dollar-based system.

China’s own economic challenges now constrain its capacity to anchor a new order. Slowing growth, demographic decline, capital controls, rising debt, technology restrictions, and investment outflows have become structural constraints. Russia, under sustained sanctions, lacks the economic depth and global reach to function as more than a spoiler. Diversification away from Western systems has therefore increased vulnerability rather than autonomy for many states, even as nations continue scrambling toward these alternatives as perceived fallback options despite systemic risks.

Deterrence and the U.S.-Led Peace Framework

The relative absence of direct great-power war since 1945 is not accidental. It is a continuous work in progress grounded in effective deterrence and credible enforcement. The system has been structured around American power, alliance networks, and forward military presence to deter aggression, set red lines, and impose consequences on rule violations.

In 2026, this logic remains intact but increasingly strained, as rival powers challenge the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S. supervision of the rules-based order. While the United States continues to maintain unmatched primacy in hard power and economic influence, bloc consolidation efforts seek to revise the narrative that concentrated American power is necessary to deter revisionist behaviour.

Sanctions Enforcement and the Reassertion of Control

Recent U.S. actions against sanctions evasion, particularly involving Venezuela, have revived the credibility of enforcement and red lines. Proxy trade networks, illicit shipping, and financial loopholes are no longer tolerated with impunity.

The strategic impact extends beyond Caracas. Venezuela had served as a testing ground for China and Russia to bypass U.S. financial controls and challenge American influence through opaque trade and geopolitical penetration. President Trump’s actions upended long-standing tolerance for such behaviour. Venezuela has become a precedent rather than an exception, reshaping expectations across the system and reinforcing the reality that attempts to circumvent U.S. power will invite direct pushback.

This has altered behaviour globally. Even states seeking strategic autonomy are reassessing exposure to secondary sanctions and U.S. financial leverage. The message in 2026 is clear: economic neutrality does not insulate actors from geopolitical consequences under a Trump administration prepared to enforce outcomes.

Alliance Burden-Sharing and Strategic Discipline

The insistence on burden-sharing and the demand that allies cease free-riding under the U.S. security umbrella has become a defining reality. This pressure has revived NATO and accelerated rearmament across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Defence spending increases in Japan, Poland, and other partners are reshaping deterrence balances, with arms buildups continuing into 2026.

Rather than weakening alliances, compelled burden-sharing has strengthened their credibility. Deterrence now rests increasingly on distributed capacity alongside American primacy, reducing Washington’s strain in sustaining multiple theatres while enhancing collective resilience.

Geoeconomics and Strategic Sectors

Power competition in 2026 is increasingly defined by control over critical sectors: artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths, and energy. Supply chains have become core national security assets.

U.S. policy has focused on restricting adversarial access to advanced technologies, reshoring production, and diversifying dependencies. These measures are not isolationist but strategic – aimed at denying rivals the revenue, leverage, and technological base needed to challenge the existing order or weaponise interdependence.

Tariffs as an Instrument of Statecraft

Tariffs have emerged as a first-line coercive instrument following diplomacy. Operating within formal trade frameworks, they nonetheless shape strategic outcomes. In 2026, states are compelled to calibrate policy decisions with U.S. market access and security guarantees in mind.

This approach proved effective in 2025, with President Trump using tariffs as leverage to end multiple conflicts and prevent escalation. The centrality of the American economy as a stabilising force remains intact, anchored by U.S. consumption, investment, technological leadership, and its role as a security guarantor.

Greenland, the Arctic, and Strategic Geography

The Arctic is emerging as a critical theatre for missile defence, maritime routes, and resource access. Greenland’s value lies in early-warning systems, deterrence architecture, and future trade corridors.

Only the United States possesses the capacity to secure this region at scale. European powers, despite political objections, remain dependent on U.S. capabilities to defend both the Arctic and their eastern flank. Russia and China continue expanding their presence, making Greenland a critical frontline where American capabilities remain indispensable to protecting Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and global stability.

The Stakes for NATO and the Western System

Efforts by European and Asian allies to develop fallback options reflect uncertainty, but fragmentation weakens deterrence and invites exploitation. Revisionist powers are already capitalising on perceived Western divisions over tariffs, Greenland, and Venezuela. Moves by Canada, France, South Korea, and others to diversify ties with China reflect insurance strategies against potential U.S. retrenchment.

Yet credibility depends less on rhetorical unity than strategic coherence. U.S. redeployment toward the Indo-Pacific and enforcement in the Western Hemisphere have constrained China without direct conflict by limiting revenue streams, technological access, and geopolitical space.

President Trump’s withdrawal from numerous international bodies has forced institutions and states to confront systemic failures long masked by globalist illusions. The retreat from performative multilateralism has compelled reassessment of mechanisms that failed to deliver stability or enforcement.

Stability of Order and Peace Through Power, Not Illusion

The global order in 2026 is not sustained by idealism but by credible deterrence and active economic leverage. Despite widespread dissatisfaction and hedging, no alternative system has demonstrated the capacity to replace the U.S.-led framework.

Trump-era policies must be understood structurally. They have reshaped incentives, imposed discipline, and reinforced the centrality of American power in sustaining decades of relative peace and stability. In a system where international law is selectively applied and competition intensifies, stability rests not on consensus but on the ability to deter, enforce, and sustain order.

In that sense, 2026 confirms a familiar but often resisted conclusion: the international system still turns on American power, whether others welcome it or not.

*Collins Chong Yew Keat is a foreign affairs and strategy analyst and author in University of Malaya.*