By Alan Ting

KOTA KINABALU, Malaysia: Sabah, Malaysia’s easternmost state, has long been viewed as a frontier — rich in resources, culturally diverse, and geopolitically vital. Yet beneath its natural beauty and strategic importance lies a simmering discontent that foreign actors could easily exploit. 

Corruption, underdevelopment, and long-festering grievances about the erosion of Sabah’s cultural and political rights have made the state a breeding ground for disillusionment. If left unaddressed, these issues could provide fertile ground for separatist narratives — and even destabilising foreign interference.

One of the deepest scars in Sabah’s political memory is Projek IC, the controversial operation under which thousands of Muslim immigrants from the southern Philippines were allegedly granted citizenship to alter Sabah’s demographic and electoral balance. 

Critics argue that Projek IC amounted to nothing less than demographic engineering, carried out to tilt the state permanently in favour of pro-Kuala Lumpur political forces. 

This, combined with reports of mass religious conversions encouraged by actors from Peninsular Malaysia, has created a lasting perception that Sabah’s identity was deliberately diluted. Such grievances cut across ethnic and religious lines, leaving many Sabahans with a sense of betrayal — not only by the federal government but also by their own political elites, who were seen as complicit.

These wounds have been compounded by chronic underdevelopment. Despite Sabah’s natural wealth, including oil and gas reserves, the state remains one of the poorest in Malaysia. 

Basic infrastructure lags far behind that of Peninsular states, and indigenous communities in rural Sabah frequently lack reliable access to healthcare, education, and clean water. 

For decades, Sabahans have felt that their contributions to the federal coffers are not matched by fair returns. This fuels a narrative of economic extraction without commensurate investment, making “states’ rights” an increasingly potent slogan in local politics.

It is precisely this environment of grievance that foreign actors are eager to exploit. The Philippines has never formally dropped its historic claim to Sabah, rooted in the old Sulu Sultanate’s cession agreements. 

While Manila today maintains a more cautious posture, periodic flare-ups in Philippine political discourse remind Sabahans that their homeland is seen as contested territory across the Sulu Sea. Such claims provide fertile ground for nationalists and separatists who wish to internationalise Sabah’s grievances.

China, too, looms in the background. Beijing has no direct claim to Sabah but has mastered the art of leveraging discontent to weaken Southeast Asian governments. 

Through its expanding influence in the South China Sea and investments across Borneo, China could opportunistically fan Sabah’s grievances as a way of pressuring Kuala Lumpur in wider regional disputes. 

Malaysia’s balancing act between its sovereignty and Chinese economic enticements is already precarious; instability in Sabah would provide Beijing with yet another lever.

Australia’s role is subtler but no less significant. In 2023, Sabah separatists announced the so-called Republic of Sabah North Borneo Government-in-Exile in a “historic proclamation,” establishing their base in Melbourne. 

While the group lacks recognition or real authority, its symbolic value should not be underestimated. 

By declaring themselves as the legitimate representatives of Sabah on Australian soil, they have internationalised Sabah’s grievances and signalled to discontented Sabahans that independence is not merely a fantasy but a project being articulated abroad.

The fact that such a proclamation could occur in a Western democracy—without serious rebuke—shows how easily Sabah’s cause can be appropriated by external platforms. 

Left unchecked, these movements provide ready-made narratives for foreign actors who wish to destabilise Malaysia, whether by questioning its territorial integrity or by lending moral cover to separatist rhetoric inside the state.

Against this backdrop, the upcoming Sabah state elections take on new importance. Parties across the spectrum — from Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) and Parti Warisan Sabah to federal players like Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional — understand that they must be seen as champions of Sabah’s rights. 

Calls for greater control over natural resources, more equitable revenue-sharing, and enhanced autonomy are now electoral necessities rather than fringe demands. 

Failure to address these issues risks handing the separatists an easy talking point: that Sabah’s legitimate aspirations can never be met within the Malaysian federation.

At the same time, state politicians face a delicate balancing act. Too much emphasis on autonomy, framed in absolutist terms, risks pushing Sabah further down the path of separatism. 

Too little, and they appear as mere proxies of Kuala Lumpur. The art of statesmanship in Sabah today lies in articulating strong demands for fairness while affirming a commitment to Malaysia’s unity. Federal leaders, for their part, must show good faith by going beyond token concessions. 

Concrete reforms are needed — from revisiting the Malaysia Agreement of 1963 to ensuring a larger share of oil royalties stays in Sabah.

Repairing federal-state ties also requires confronting the darker legacies of the past. Projek IC remains a festering wound that successive governments have refused to fully investigate. Establishing a truth and reconciliation mechanism, or at the very least acknowledging the wrongs done, could help rebuild trust. 

Equally, greater investment in rural development and education would go a long way toward addressing the perception of Sabah as a neglected periphery. 

Transparency and accountability in resource management must be prioritised to break the cycle of corruption that has plagued both state and federal administrations.

The broader lesson here is that domestic grievances, if ignored, rarely remain domestic for long. In a globalised world where separatist movements can find platforms abroad — whether in Manila, Beijing, or Melbourne — local discontent becomes a tool for foreign leverage. 

Malaysia cannot afford to allow Sabah’s issues to fester until they are weaponised by others.

Ultimately, Sabah does not need foreign “champions” to articulate its grievances. What it needs is a federal government that listens, a state government that acts responsibly, and political leaders on both sides willing to put the interests of ordinary Sabahans ahead of their own short-term gains. 

The upcoming elections will serve as a litmus test: will parties rise to the challenge of repairing trust and balancing state rights with national unity, or will they continue to play into the hands of those who would see Malaysia divided?

The choice is urgent. For Sabah, the stakes are nothing less than its future within Malaysia. For the federation, the challenge is to ensure that unity is not maintained by coercion or manipulation, but by trust, fairness, and genuine partnership. Anything less would leave the door wide open for foreign actors eager to see Malaysia stumble.

*Alan Ting is an observer of regional affairs and global geopolitics based in the Land Below the Wind.*