By Lucien Morell

JAKARTA, Indonesia: Washington risks sleepwalking into strategic irrelevance in Southeast Asia. While the Biden administration bleeds billions into the European front, Beijing quietly consolidates its grip on ASEAN.

The United States talks about the Indo-Pacific as the “priority theater,” but its actions show otherwise. If Washington cannot decisively pivot away from Ukraine, it will lose ASEAN—and with it, the Indo-Pacific balance.

The numbers speak for themselves. Nearly two hundred billion dollars have been shoveled into Ukraine since 2022. That money comes at the expense of submarine construction, shipyard modernization, and missile stockpiles urgently needed for a Taiwan contingency or a South China Sea crisis.

U.S. production lines for artillery and long-range munitions remain stretched thin. Every round sent to Europe is one less available for Indo-Pacific deterrence. Beijing can see the strain—and so can ASEAN capitals.

This isn’t just about weapons. It’s about bandwidth. ASEAN nations have little interest in Washington’s European crusade.Many refuse to toe the line on sanctions against Moscow.

They want the war off the agenda so economic and security issues in their own region can take precedence. Yet U.S. officials arrive in Southeast Asia with Ukraine talking points while China offers port deals, digital infrastructure, and a ready presence in disputed waters.

The result? A widening credibility gap.

Meanwhile, China is moving fast. In the South China Sea, it has escalated gray-zone coercion against the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally. Around Malaysia and Indonesia, Chinese vessels probe and pressure, testing U.S. resolve.

And in the information space, Beijing sells itself as the only reliable partner focused on ASEAN’s actual concerns. Washington’s Ukraine fixation is Beijing’s strategic gift.

ASEAN is not a bloc that flips overnight. But influence erodes by slices. If America cannot deliver AUKUS submarines on time, if its shipyards keep falling behind schedule, if its attention remains locked on the Donbas, then ASEAN nations will default to China’s gravitational pull.

It will not look like dramatic betrayal; it will look like hedging, silence, and deals struck quietly with Beijing. That is de facto loss.

The path forward requires ruthless prioritization. Europe must be told to lead in Europe. U.S. support for Ukraine should shift to niche enablers and training, while the EU assumes full responsibility for volume sustainment.

U.S. resources must be reprogrammed into Indo-Pacific power projection: modernizing shipyards, expanding missile throughput, and accelerating AUKUS delivery. Congress should reallocate unobligated Ukraine funds into Pacific defense accounts, and the White House should put Southeast Asia—not Brussels—at the center of its travel schedule and trade agenda.

Washington must also deliver visible wins where ASEAN is watching. A Malacca Strait Maritime Initiative, domain awareness and patrol support for Indonesia and Malaysia, and a standing incident-response fund for the Philippines and Vietnam would demonstrate seriousness.

Pair this with commercial deals that matter to ASEAN economies, not endless rhetoric about European security.

At home, the U.S. political class must stop letting neo-con adventurists define the agenda. Voices calling for restraint and Pacific-first strategy must take the lead. That means telling the Lindsey Grahams of Washington that the Indo-Pacific is the pacing theater, not the Donbas.

It means demanding that presidential candidates—Trump included—stop posturing and start prioritizing China containment.

The hard truth is this: America cannot fight two primary wars at once. Pretending otherwise only weakens both efforts. Ukraine matters, but China is the pacing threat.

If Washington cannot disengage from Ukraine, ASEAN will slip further into Beijing’s orbit. If it can, it still has a chance to anchor the Indo-Pacific and preserve U.S. primacy in the most decisive region of the 21st century.