By Collins Chong Yew Keat

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia: The ASEAN-GCC-China platform remains a strategic effort in increasing economic friendshoring that can boost the potential and relevance of the ASEAN market and in finding new trade and market consolidation and alternatives in serving as the guardrails against the tariff impact.

Beijing is trying to leverage on this move to expand its narratives and support seeking movement in shoring up the anti-tariff perspectives and support from the Global South, and this is more significant coming at the heels of Trump’s charm offensive in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.

This creates new risks for ASEAN, as these efforts to align deeper with the anti-US alternative including more of China led initiatives and with BRICS and potential new de-dollarisation efforts will invite further retaliation from Washington, and potentially even marking ASEAN further down the line as one that is of even lesser importance and rate of returns to Washington’s priorities under Trump.

Already reeling from it being a lost cause in China containment and the uninspiring economic and market returns to the US, ASEAN might find itself once again to be of deeper irrelevance in the eyes of the Trump administration and even will be viewed as hostile, with deeper defence spending but offering practically nothing in return to American interests.

Under the Trump administration, the region has yet to be effective in giving a new positive perception in terms of returns and offerings to the US, as opposed  to the defence commitment and support given to the region.

Despite this, ASEAN is seen to be moving closer to China, and with greater hostility to Washington in forming a synergised movement as an entity and in having the bigger cards of aligning with new anti-US alternatives, including BRICS and the Global South, in forming new trade and economic dependencies.

Southeast Asian Charm Offensive

China’s engagement with Southeast Asia has transformed from a cautious diplomatic outreach in the 1990s to a multi-faceted influence strategy by the 2020s. Economically, China is now the largest trading partner for ASEAN as a whole and for most member states, bolstering its leverage.

From BRI to RCEP, all these are meant to dislodge Japan and US as the traditional economic and defence anchors for the region, and this calculated move has been successful in forming a new dependency based on both market and trade necessities and fear of the Chinese force and threats, leaving the region trapped in its own policy responses and options.

Diplomatically, China projects itself as a benevolent neighbor and defender of Asia’s concept of multipolarity and Asians for Asia.

Even as China engages ASEAN economically, it has not softened its hard security stance. China continues to press its expansive claims in the South China Sea (SCS), deploying its coast guard vessels and maritime militias.

Going forward, China’s influence strategy in ASEAN  will be intensified, as Xi seeks to capitalise on the region’s quest to seek alternative markets and options against the tariff and also in leveraging on the region’s new fear of Trump’s transactional approach.

For Xi, as China seeks to expand its new alternative options in the tariff and decoupling impact, this region is the most obvious and easiest route and avenue in providing both the resources, and future market potential.

As Beijing seeks to consolidate its southern flank assurance, it is moving fast to secure deeper trust and increase soft power push, taking advantage of the vacuum and the collective disdain of regional powers for Trump’s new approach.

Beijing would welcome the new ASEAN-China-Middle East-Gulf platform espoused by Malaysia, as it seeks to further link the two regions both in conformity of policies and outlook and sharing of resources and common security of trade routes, but also in doubling down on similar common narratives and influence over the two regional powers, and hoping for ASEAN to remain neutral and hedging.

For ASEAN to remain neutral, this gives Beijing a free hand to dictate power terms and use that as a pretext to ward off further Western influence.
Nonetheless, China’s growing clout raises suspicions in some ASEAN capitals, and Beijing is aware that heavy-handedness could backfire.

At the same time, Beijing is poised to exploit any faltering U.S. commitment: if Washington retreats, China will present itself as the reliable partner who shows up for ASEAN.

Cognisant of this systemic and structural ASEAN weakness and trap, both Beijing and Washington have seen the vulnerabilities to their own agenda, and are using this gap to strengthen their counter offensive.

ASEAN Needs to Regain Lost Western Counterbalance

For the U.S., ASEAN is seen as a lost cause in standing up strongly against Beijing because of the endemic reliance on Beijing’s economic, capital and technological capacity that are needed to fuel the region’s growth and in line with the quest to escape from the middle income trap and to ensure domestic political needs and security.

Hence, not upsetting the apple cart seems the safest best for most ASEAN members, and to stick to conventional hedging. Some efforts of cosmetic show of solidarity and show of force have been initiated as a message that ASEAN remains united, with the first-ever joint drill exercises in 2023, but failed to provide any credible and lasting deterrence.

Manila has made up its mind to protect its sovereignty and rights among all others, and publicly and officially having a defence alliance with Washington is seen as the safest bet.

Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur tried to preserve the tradition of strategic balancing and nuanced hedging, trying to get the best of economic deals and assurance from Beijing, while careful not to abandon the defence support from Washington, but face a perpetual limbo of not meeting the needed returns on both sides.

Cambodia and Laos are seen as almost adhering to the irreversible tilt towards Beijing, while Thailand is trying to balance its relations with both Beijing and Washington. Only Vietnam has the higher strategic card and with bigger tools in playing both the carrot and stick approach with both China and the US, despite its Four No’s approach.

Beijing would hope for the ASEAN neutrality mantra to continue, as being so will limit Washington’s direct power presence and intervention, and will translate to a freer hand for Beijing in this region.

However, with dwindling economic and demographic prospects and internal decline, Beijing is facing a time trap of its own in achieving the 100-Year Marathon of 2049 Goal, and is now also facing a more sceptical and wary ASEAN of its future economic role as the ultimate dependent tool for the region.

Most of the emerging and pressing threats will most likely fall under this decade, where a time trapped Xi who is facing a relatively weaker military capacity compared to the US in net power advantage where Washington will have a total robust military might starting in the 2030s as a result of rebuilding this decade, Beijing and Xi will most likely be forced to fully utilise this time gap and a slight relative power advantage in this remaining decade to create the first punch.

From ASEAN’s perspective, getting Washington to truly invest in the region requires addressing Trump’s concerns and altering the cost-benefit calculus. With the new tariffs and the negotiations, ASEAN  players will also want to send a new offer and message to Trump to reignite the combined potential of the region to court Trump, knowing how Washington will still be the region’s top defence supporter.

If Trump’s team can be convinced that losing ASEAN means China wins, they may view re-engagement as serving U.S. competitive interests. Conversely, without a shift in Trump’s transactional worldview, ASEAN might struggle to command sustained high-level U.S. attention.

While all proclaim a desire to maintain ASEAN’s neutrality and centrality, in practice, each country balances its own security, economic needs, and historical experiences.

*Collins Chong Yew Keat is a foreign affairs and strategy analyst and author in University of Malaya.*