Source By Murray Hunter

BANGKOK, Thailand: Over the last 22 years, the Thai Deep South has been subjected to a violent insurgency, where more than 7,000 people have been killed as a consequence. The current insurgency is based upon claims going back hundreds of years over the sovereignty of Greater Pattani, which has now been broken up into three provinces Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat in Southern Thailand.

The insurgency flared up in 2003 by a number of separatist insurgency groups of which the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) claims to be the major group.

The Deep South is a very heterogeneous region in the south-eastern part of Thailand, where ethnic Thais are a minority group. According to academics, the insurgency flared up over economic and cultural issues. The Thai government for many years pushed a policy of ‘Thainess’ in the region, where symbols such as government offices, temples, schools, civil servants, and monks became targets by insurgents. Over the years, there have been a number of assassinations of police, military personnel, civil servants and monks. Roads and trainlines are often laced with bombs in an attempt to disrupt transportation. Symbols of ‘Thainess’ are sometimes attacked and damaged out of pushback on the Thai state.

The government has responded by putting some 75,000 military and para-military personnel on the ground. These personnel are visible to the public and the inconveniences causes often lead to public frustration. The military find it very difficult to fight an enemy, which is both informal and only grouped together for specific planned operations, where it then disappears back into communities.

There have been a number of incidents which angered public sentiment, creating martyrs out of the insurgents. The Tak Bai massacre occurred on 25th October 2004, when the army piled suspected terrorists on trucks, resulting in 85 deaths from suffocation. Then in October 2007, 105 insurgents died in a shoot-out with Thai military that surrounded the Krue Se Mosque in Patani. The Krue Se Mosque with the battle scars still remaining has become a de facto-shrine of remembrance of the ‘struggle for Patani’, attracting many visitors on a daily basis.

Many myths have grown around the Thai Deep South insurgency. Many of these enhanced by journalists, who don’t live in the area itself. The rest of this article will look at these myths, and offer alternative narratives that may better reflect the realities.

1. The Deep South is stricken in poverty

Many analysts of the Deep South have cited ‘poverty’ is widespread across the region. If one mistakes communities preferring to live traditionally as farmers and fishermen, it might be easy to make such conclusions. Its very difficult to measure wealth and wellbeing using monetary measurements.

The rise in demand for durians has transformed many rural parts of the region over the last decade. There has been a surge in SME development, where nascent entrepreneurship is at all time highs. The towns have vibrant nightlife, with an exponential leap in places to eat and drink.

There appears to be little concern amongst most urban and rural MSME proprietors for the ideological issues of the insurgency.

2. Many civic leaders in the Deep South are Muslims

The population of the Deep South is represented by a large number of civic leaders in local, regional, and provincial governments. The speaker in the Thai Parliament Wan Muhamad Noor Matha is a native from Yala Province. The governor of Pattani Province Pateemoh Sadeeyamu, is a native of Yala and a Muslim. As the Deep South is a majority Muslim region most candidates for local elections are Muslims.

To a large extent, government of the Deep South is controlled by Muslims. Local and provincial government in Thailand has a large list of responsibilities of government and management affecting the population. This can now be seen in the symbols on local government infrastructure. In essence, Muslims in the Deep South are governed by Muslims.

In contrast, separatist groups don’t represent the views of the majority of the people of the Deep South. This undermines the legitimacy of these groups, as the support base is small. The extent of sympathies the local population has for these separatist groups has never been measured. This is made even more complex, as different separatist groups hold different doctrines, ideologies, and engagement with the communities around them. In Narathiwat, some youth is attracted towards BRN-C for the group’s Salafi leaning. Many locals are alienated by the violence of these groups. Many empathise with activists like Soraya Jamjuree, who advocates peace and inclusion, which may better reflect the sentiments of the people.

3. Neither BRN or PULO directly control insurgents on the ground

Another myth is that Mara Patani (Majlis Syura Patani) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) actually control insurgents at the grassroots level. Insurgency cells today within the Deep South are informal, fluid, spasmodic in their operations, and act primarily unilaterally and in isolation. Most of these cells don’t communicate with each other or take orders from higher authorities.

The Thai government is negotiating with MARA Patani, which is made up of representatives very far away from the grassroots. Its difficult to see how MARA Patani could consult with and hold the views of various insurgency cells in the region, yet be able to control and direct them.

4. MARA Patani is unable to ‘do any deal’ that would bring an end to the insurgency

Many articles and reports on the Deep South place great weight on the nature and progress of negotiations between the umbrella group and the Thai government, with Malaysian mediation. The Thai government is talking to a group which cannot make any decisions. After a decade of negotiations not even a TOR (Terms of Reference) for the discussions has been agreed upon.

As of late, the government carried out some ‘secret’ discussions with a BRN group, but this group also cannot speak on behalf of insurgents on the ground.

These discussions have proved time and time again that they lead nowhere. On the government side, negotiators are regularly changed with different strategies. Often positive announcements are made to garner public favour and the appearance of progress.

Absent in the negotiations are members of the community of the Deep South itself, who are important stake holders. There are no community inputs into the issue in this ‘continual peace process’. Some longtime observers say that no one within the peace process actually wants a solution.

Any solution to the Deep South insurgency will only come from the people of the region themselves. Outsiders to date have too many ‘agendas’, which are not helpful.

5. The military may have hindered rather than aided the peace process

There are many views about the role the military has played in the Deep South insurgency. Some claim the military has been a hinderance and put many locals offside in some for their programs, including the forced taking of genetic body material for bio-identity systems. On the whole, the military has not made the area safe, and used the wrong tactics and equipment to approach the whole problem. As such, some claim the whole military exercise has been aimed at gaining maximum budget allocations from the government.

The military has taken land and built small forts through out the region. Such structures have accomplished nothing. The very presence of the military within the region, according to some, is that it has inflamed the situation and led to more acts of violence by the insurgents.

6. The Muslims of the Deep South don’t identify as Malays

The concept of a ‘Malay’ is an orientalist concept brought in by the British during their occupation of the Tanah Melayu (the Malay peninsula). Malays in the peninsula are made up of many migratory groups, which include Javanese, Batak, Minang Kabau, Bugis, Banjarese, and other Riau groups.

The Muslims of Patani have a very long history on their land, where they see themselves as Orang Patani, or Patani people. The Sultanate of Patani goes back to 1350, derived from an older Hindu-Buddhist Langkasuka going back to the second century. Their identity is unique, where very few are willing to move away from their place of birth. This is still true today.

The Deep South has a powerful kinship, where Thais, Chinese, and those from Indian and Arab ancestry lived in co-existence for centuries. Today, new influences of Salafism are taking hold in the region, alongside a strong entrepreneurial culture.

Most people in the region today see themselves as Patani-Thais and are proud of this identity. Being both Khun Thai (Thai citizen) and Orang Patani have no contradictions or sense of identity stress.

The progression into the future will most likely be a continuance of the current status quo. The insurgency is transforming from a cultural one, towards a religious one, as the new generation infiltrates the insurgency groups.